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Abstract 
This dissertaEon was wri+en as part of the LL.M. in TransnaEonal & European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, ArbitraEon/MediaEon at the InternaEonal Hellenic 
University.  
The COVID-19 pandemic (more commonly known as Coronavirus) poses 
unprecedented threats and challenges for individuals and countries around the world. 
The need to stop its spread and cure those who are suffering is a prominent goal 
shared by naEons globally. Moreover, COVID-19 caused shock to individuals and 
countries, iniEaEng from the speed of the transmission of this Coronavirus, that finally 
there was no possibility to be dealt this emergency even by the most advanced health 
systems. In the effort of curbing the number of new contaminaEons, governments have 
had to resort to extraordinary measures, including the declaraEon of a state of 
emergency in many cases. However, the exercise of human rights, like the right to Data 
ProtecEon, is applicable and cannot be suspended but only derogated or restricted by 
law, to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situaEon while respecEng 
the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms. 
The present dissertaEon aims at addressing the impact of COVID-19 on the protecEon 
of personal data, even in those emergency and extraordinary cases. More specifically, 
an effort will be made in order to face the above issue, focusing on the following 
points: 
-Processing of health-related data, forming the special category data, during the 
pandemic 
-Data processing by employers (remote work) or by students (distance educaEon) 
-Digital epidemic surveillance (e.g. contact tracking, mobile tracing) 
The issue to be faced is, whether GDPR conform processing is sEll possible.  
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Introduc8on 
“All human beings have three lives: public, private, and secret.” 
― Gabriel García Márquez” 
ProtecEon of personal data  is absolutely a human right, but it is not an absolute 1
human right. Data protecEon is considered as high priority for, at least, European 
NaEons and that is the reason, for the increasing concerns about how retaining 
personal data protecEon against the need to suppress pandemic SARS-CoV-2 (hereaker 
COVID-19 or coronavirus). Despite these concerns, data protecEon, through these 
tough pandemic years, is not taken for granted. The changes of the data process 
worldwide, are radical, also the speed of these changes is verEginous and the 
humanity was not ready for such eventuality. 
Referring to a human right as a non absolute right, indicates, and therefore highlights, 
the difficulEes in its protecEon. The difficulEes protecEng personal data tends to peak 
in emergencies and force majeure situaEons, when other individual rights such as 
public health and safety, and in general public interest, must be protected as well. 
When these emergencies are faced, and while considering personal data protecEon 
not being an absolute human right, it shall be balanced in and for every separate case 
that arises. There is no general rule. The duty of balancing this top priority right  with 2
others, shall be “in accordance with the Principle of ProporEonality”, a cornerstone 
Principle that is diffused in the legislaEon of RegulaEon (EU) 2016/679 of European 
 See the relevant definitions in Article 4 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and especially: Article 4 (1) 1
‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to 
one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity of that natural person; (2) ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as 
collection, recording, organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
restriction, erasure or destruction; (…) etc”.
 Quite contradictory, on writer’s opinion, because this priority is finally on the surface and not substantial.2
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Parliament and Council of 27th April 2016  (hereaker the RegulaEon or GDPR), it is also 3
menEoned in all relevant legislaEon, guidelines, opinions, statements etc .  4
At this point, a separaEon of concepts must be realized. ProtecEon of personal data is 
only an area of the broader concept of privacy. In fact, data protecEon right serves 
more purposes than privacy, and in that sense it is broader than privacy . On the other 5
hand though, privacy is broader than data protecEon, because it is consisted by other 
elements, as the right to be alone, the right to respect private or family life . 6
Consequently, the above two concepts, data protecEon and privacy, are not the same 
but sEll both are connected and interacEng . The data protecEon right depends on 7
privacy and, at a certain level, it secures privacy. It is not only protected when it is 
violated, but it obligates all the processors to be organized to a certain regulatory field. 
And that leads to a conclusion, that though it is a non absolute right - and therefore it 
shall be balanced with other rights, in order the legal purposes of data processing to be 
indicated against the legiEmate intrusion of that right - data protecEon seems to be a 
“consEtuEonalized” right, that is volaEle depending on the purposes that is needed to 
protect . 8
Another topic, that shall be examined in the new COVID-19 era, is the lawful processing 
of data, especially of the special categories of personal data. Lawful processing is one 
 GDPR Recital 4 “The processing of personal data should be designed to serve mankind. The right to 3
the protection of personal data is not an absolute right; it must be considered in relation to its function in 
society and be balanced against other fundamental rights, in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality. This Regulation respects all fundamental rights and observes the freedoms and principles 
recognised in the Charter as enshrined in the Treaties, in particular the respect for private and family life, 
home and communications, the protection of personal data, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
freedom of expression and information, freedom to conduct a business, the right to an effective remedy 
and to a fair trial, and cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. “
 Article 9A Constitution of Greece, Guidelines and opinions of EDPB (European Data Protection Board) 4
and national DPA’s (Data Protection Authorities) that are going to be analyzed below.
 Mitrou L, The Personal Data Protection Right, 2012, pp.42-47.5
 Article 8 ECHR (European Charter for Human Rights).6
 Akrivopoulou X., ”The Data Protection Right through the lens of Privacy’, Theory & Praxis of Public Law 7
Journal Session 7, 2011, <http://www.nomikospoudastirio.gr/δημοσιεύσεις-–νομικές-μελέτες/1300-χ-
ακριβοπούλου,-το-δικαίωμα-στην-προστασία-των-προσωπικών-δεδομένων-μέσα-από-το-φακό-του-
δικαιώματος-στην-ιδιωτική-ζωή> (accessed: 20.01.2021).
Mitrou L., The Personal Data Protection Right, 2012, pp. 42-47, Akrivopoulou X., “In Between Autonomy 8
& Intimacy - Self-defining the right to privacy”, 2009, p. 422, https://thesis.ekt.gr/thesisBookReader/id/
20504#page/1/mode/2up (accessed: 20.01.2021). 
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of the principles, that are relaEng to process of any category of data . The GDPR 9
repeats the implicaEon of the previous DirecEve 95/46 , and imposes the lawful 10
processing of personal data. This principle is not defined exactly in the provisions, but it 
is implied in recital 40 GDPR, where a reference to lawful processing of data is also 
made . More specifically, enEEes shall not process data, and mostly special categories 11
of data, unless there is a legal basis for that acEon, a legiEmate ground . And to that 12
point, the above prohibiEon must be seen as an excepEon. This excepEon, that also 
consists one of the principles in protecEng data, leads to the reducEon of personal data 
protecEon . Data protecEon limitaEon is also recognized in ArEcle 52 (1) of the 13
European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR) . Aker all, some other severe rights, like 14
the health right and the duty of the governments to take care of the ciEzens’ health, is 
also consEtuEonalized . Therefore, in case of conflicEng rights, some are limited and 15
some prevail. 
The aim of this paper is the examinaEon whether the COVID-19 pandemic is the reason 
for the limitaEon of a non absolute but fundamental right, as data protecEon, invoking 
the meaning of public interest or health right? 
In case of a posiEve answer to the above quesEon, up to what level shall be occurred 
this limitaEon of personal data protecEon - balancing the rights that have to be 
 Other principles are the processing of personal data shall be Fair, Transparent, Limited in purpose, in 9
storage and in quantity, Accurate,  and finally Confidential.
 Article 6 (1)(a) GDPR.10
 Rücker D./Kugler T., New European General Data Protection Regulation, 2018,  pp. 50-51.11
 Legitimate grounds for processing data are restrictively referred to Article 6 GDPR, and for special 12
categories of data, to Article 9 GDPR. Also are referred to national laws following GDPR.
 “The right to personal data protection is not an absolute right; it may be limited if necessary for an 13
objective of general interest or to protect the rights and freedoms of others.” (See, for example, CJEU, 
Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v. Land Hessen 
[GC], 9 November 2010, para. 48), Handbook on European data protection law - 2018 edition, FRA/
EctHR/EDPS, p.35
 “As long as those limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and 14
freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of 
general interest recognised by the EU or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”
  Article 21 para. 3 Greek Constitution.15
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protected as well. Up to what level the limitaEon is not considered as an abuse of the 
data protecEon right? 
Following this brief invocaEon of concepts, that have to be considered, an also brief 
historical reference, will be presented in the First Chapter, about the legislaEon 
surrounding personal data protecEon. In the Second Chapter, the issue that will be 
discussed is the presentaEon of the COVID-19 case and what happened in the field of 
legislaEon. The Third Chapter is focusing on what are COVID-19 case’s pillars, what are 
the specific processes of personal data that create the danger of breach of data 
protecEon right, what are the legal grounds of those processes, if any. How the new 
Schrems II decision affects the processes when there is conducted data transfer to third 
countries. The Fourth Chapter is dealing with the balancing test of the before 
menEoned findings and the Principle of ProporEonality and finally, the Last Chapter, is 
dedicated to author’s personal opinion about the quesEons set above and a general 
conclusion. 
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Chapter One: Brief Historical Reference 
Though GDPR is -up to now- a commonly known RegulaEon, with a worldwide 
reputaEon, useful is a brief reference about its route and significant informaEon about 
its raEo. It will not be overviewed as a whole, but only in relaEon to the certain topic of 
how GDPR and any other Guideline related to RegulaEon, contributes to the protecEon 
of data. And of course, in parEcular in extraordinary and crucial circumstances, as 
COVID-19 or any other emergency situaEon, that may be faced in the future. 
1.1 Primarily set of standards for the data protec2on right 
Personal data protecEon was underlined mostly by GDPR, because of -unfortunately- 
the high administraEve fines that threatens. Extremely high fines for the violaEon of 
GDPR provisions, was the reason for such popularity, though as a legal text, there are 
more important and substanEal provisions than fines. Nevertheless, this right had been 
existed decades before. ProtecEon of personal data and special categories of data 
(known as “sensiEve”), though, was not introduced primarily by GDPR.  
Looking back, regarding that right, it is necessary to acknowledge the Conven8on 108 
in the year 1981 (and the renewed and modernized version in 2018, Conven8on 
108+) . Also, we have to consider ArEcle 8 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 16
the European Union (ECHR) , where it is stated explicitly the legal basis of any text 17
issued about data protecEon . 18
ConvenEon 108 and ECHR were a milestone. Technology started moving forward with 
maximum speed, gaining many steps in a small Eme and connecEng human beings 
with an aggressive manner. The use of the word aggressive is chosen, because 
 <https://rm.coe.int/1680078b37> 16
 Rücker D./Kugler T., New European General Data Protection Regulation, 2018,  p. 5.17
 “1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
18
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the 
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to 
data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.

3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.” 

Source:Official Journal of the European Union C 303/17 - 14.12.2007
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processing data lead to an abusing penetraEon to the field of privacy, especially online, 
without respecEng the data subject’s right and the limits of any data processing. This 
abuse caused also the reducEon of subject’s reacEons and lack of their reflexes. 
Subjects started to easily provide data and that had to cease. 
1.2 Data protec2on before GDPR 
The European Member States noEced the technological evoluEon early enough and 
the enormous danger of exposing personal data from the subjects and the abuse from 
the data controllers and processors, in 1995. There was a need of publishing an 
innovaEve legislaEon and that was the DirecEve 95/46/EU. The purpose was one: the 
miEgaEon of personal data breach or loss  and protecEon of certain rights that any 19
physical person should be free to enjoy.  
The above ambiEous DirecEve was adopted and raEfied by almost all EU members at 
that Eme , however failed to provide the absolute protecEon needed, against the 20
careless data processing by enEEes. That negaEve outcome was caused, because of the 
lack of uniformity, of Eght connecEon and of interacEon between the Member States 
(MS), in the same Eme of such speedy evaluaEon of technology informaEon. A drasEc 
change was needed, and an improved RegulaEon this Eme, was on its way aker 20 
years of DirecEve’s life and aker the explosion of the third and fourth industrial 
revoluEon. 
Α RegulaEon was needed because of its legal nature. RegulaEons directly apply with 
the same manner, at the same Eme, through all MS. To be coherence between MS and 
especially between their Data ProtecEon AuthoriEes (DPAs), under the umbrella of the 
a supervisor authority, the European Data ProtecEon Board (EDPB). 
During the applicaEon of DirecEve, plenty of Guidelines were issued by the Working 
Party of arEcle 29 (WP29) , which are sEll used nowadays, even with slight revisions 21
 And in general actions and incidents that would affect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 19
personal data, which consists the principle of data security. 
 The Directive was transposed into Greek law by  Law 2472/97.20
 https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/article-29-working-party_el 21
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from EDPB. Many Guidelines were also published by MS’s DPAs . The above material 22
consists the treasure in the field of personal data protecEon. 
1.3 The high 2me for direct applica2on of a Regula2on. 
Aker years of preparaEon, the GDPR issued in the year of 2016 without changing many 
granted provisions, but bringing in a few substanEal points . The key point for the 23
existence of a RegulaEon, was the direct and uniform applicaEon of a binding legal text 
in all MS. The structure of supervising acEons, relaEng to the data protecEon, was 
renovated by GDPR and all MS’s DPAs. This supervision and control started to be 
centralized, by EDPB. That Board is considered as a new organ. EDPB is where all 
representaEves from naEonal DPAs shall collaborate and from where guidelines are 
issued and must be implied homogeneously. Also, naEonal DPAs introduced to the 
public and private enEEes, the noEon of Data ProtecEon Officer (DPO), who should be 
DPAs extension, in order to controlling organizaEons and undertakings, whether they 
adopt the GDPR compliance, serving the rights of physical persons and securing their 
data.  
This was an administraEve change implied by GDPR, because the control should be 
remained centrally. But it was not the only innovaEon.  
• Enormous and threatening administraEve fines were introduced, for not being 
compliant towards the RegulaEon.  
• More rights  were implied from the enEEes in favor of human beings, the data 24
subjects.  
• New noEons as the privacy by design and by default were faced, binding for enEEes 
both in private and public sector. 
• NoEficaEons to the naEonal DPAs ceased, and the responsibiliEes shiked to enEEes. 
GDPR had a two years period, from 2016 when it was issued to 2018 when it should be 
in acEon, to be known by all the enEEes founded in MS but also by the enEEes of the 
third (to EU) countries that process EU ciEzens’ data. When 25th of May 2018, Eme for 
 http://www.dpa.gr, www.dataprotection.gov.cy, www.cnil.fr, www.agpd.es, and other MS’s DPAs , with 22
special contribution of United Kingdom’s and Ireland’s DPA, before BREXIT but also up to nowadays, 
https://ico.org.uk & www.dataprotection.ie.
 In Greece the national law that was issued, for the issues that was authorized to be supplemented, 23
was Law 4624/2019. 
 The right to be forgotten & the right for portability.24
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being set in acEon approached, GDPR was faced as an Armageddon and caused huge 
“noise”. Uncountable mails were sent to every EU (and not only) data subject, seeking 
for consent for subject’s data processing, while in fact this acEon was itself a breach of 
GDPR provisions in many cases.  
1.4 “Automated individual decision-making, including profiling” 
GDPR is considered a very complex text, with 99 arEcles and almost duplicated recitals, 
up to 173, where the raEo of this legislaEon is analyzed. In fact, all the substanEal 
interpretaEon of the RegulaEon is located in these recitals. One of the most important 
arEcle, though, is the arEcle, that will decisively affect the new pracEces coming in the 
future. Especially, will affect the effort in controlling pandemic COVID-19, when the use 
of some arEficial intelligence (AI) or smart devices and applicaEons, is necessary. That 
is the arEcle 22 GDPR .  25
When we talk about “automated decision making” and “profiling” , we consider a 26
contribuEon to a no-turn back situaEon: “the development of automated decision 
making, without human intervenEon”. This decision making is based upon arEficial 
intelligence algorithms, and will replace fully the process by humans. It is self-evident 
how dangerous this operaEon can be. It is a tool but with wrong handlings, it may also 
be a weapon. Algorithms may fully replace human resources and all the process will be 
conducted by the process of data by AI devices.  
In risk management, such as pandemic treatment, is already decided that some 
applicaEons as contact tracing and mobile tracking and monitoring or mass mapping 
and demographic quaranEning, are promoted . The profiling and decision making by 27
AI devices is unavoidable. In fact, that process has been absolute relied on profiling. 
 “The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated 25
processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly 
significantly affects him or her”.
 The constitutive elements are: a) profiling must be automated, b) profiling must be performed on 26
personal data, c) the goal of the profiling must be to evaluate certain personal aspects of the individual. 
 Singapore case study “s73 of the Infectious Diseases Act34 (hereinafter referred to as “the IDA”). This 27
includes an individual who: enters Singapore (by land, sea or air) from a country or territory outside 
Singapore during the control period; before or during the control period, comes into contact or has come 
into contact with any other individual who is, or is suspected to be, infected with COVID-19; …”
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The ethical challenges , that have been caused by the effort and the purpose to save 28
mankind, have many parameters. In parEcular challenges about:  
a.whether is accepted the prevalence of public interest towards privacy and personal 
data protecEon. The high need of controlling pandemic has lead to the closest 
surveillance and use of AI, for decision making and profiling. There is framework in 
GDPR for lawful process of data, especially health data, in the context of pandemic. 
ArEcle 9 GDPR implies “the processing of personal data for reasons of public interest in 
the area of public health, such as protecEng against serious cross-border threats to 
health,” as long as that kind of process is proporEonate and for a certain purpose. That 
means, that, while lacking of Eme, authoriEes have to provide a - to the depth - impact 
assessment.  
b.whether the human dignity can be protected equally, towards the coveted public 
interest. There is a sEgma threatening humans, who share health data, a discriminaEon 
that exceeds to the family, children even parents or further relaEves of the diseased 
vicEms . Governments shall cover dignity with a solid protecEon shield. Together with 29
dignity, it shall be examined the challenge, whether there is data bias, that could lead 
to discriminaEon upon race and gender 
c.whether there is transparency in collecEng data. Transparency is connected with the 
duty to disclose to humans what data are collected, for what purpose and where are 
they transmi+ed. Transparency is very important especially when Governments 
dominate private enEEes . 30
 Findlay M., Jia Yuan Loke, Remolina N, Tham B, Research Paper No. 2020/02, “ETHICS, AI, MASS 28
DATA AND PANDEMIC CHALLENGES: RESPONSIBLE DATA USE AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
APPLICATION FOR SURVEILLANCE AND PRE-EMPTIVE TRACING POST- CRISIS” Singapore 
Management University, Centre for AI and Data Governance, pp.29-42.
 Example given people with HIV in South Africa and the United States faced discrimination and have 29
problems getting jobs or attending school, also the stigma against survivors of Ebola in West Africa.
 “Apple and Google are jointly developing technology to alert people if they have recently come into 30
contact with others found to be infected with coronavirus. Their contact-tracing method would work by 
using a smartphone's Bluetooth signals to determine to whom the owner had recently been in proximity 
for long enough to have established contagion a risk. See Leo Kelion, “Coronavirus: Apple and Google 
team up to contact trace Covid-19”, BBC News (10 April 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology- 
52246319> (accessed 27 April 2020); Patrick Howell O'Neill, “How Apple and Google are tackling their 
covid privacy problem”, MIT Technology Review (14 April 2020) <https://www.technologyreview.com/
2020/04/14/999472/how-apple-and-google-are-tackling-their- covid-privacy-problem/> (accessed 27 
April 2020).
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d.also the challenge whether the data will be expired aker emergencies, which is not 
self-evident, and the challenge of explainability .  31
Among the securiEes offered by the 99 arEcles of GDPR, for personal data protecEon, 
this unique arEcle 22 is the cornerstone, protecEng the absolute surrender of human 
rights, related to data, to the Rubicon of AI . This anxiety that is hidden behind arEcle 32
22 GDPR, leads to the conclusion that our lives are finally digiEzed and privacy is 
transcendent.  
SEll, we shall not ignore, nor underesEmate, the value of the principles of GDPR in 
ArEcles 5 (1)(a)- (3), 6 or 9 , that are guardians for data subjects. In parEcular, the 33
principles of lawful data processing  and transparency. For instance, for lawful process 34
of special categories of data, we shall consider the condiEons set in arEcle 9 (2) 
together with arEcle 22 (2) and (4) .  35
Pandemic though, cast a strong doubt about the protecEon provided by the above 
menEoned legal basis. Aker all, the legal frame is not a panacea for abusing human 
rights. 
 Article 13 (2) (f) stipulates that “the controller must provide additional information if the existence of 31
automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those 
cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged 
consequences of such processing for the data subject”. 
 Below, will be presented the ways that will cause such an intervention to subject’s rights and the 32
excessive introduction of smart devices or apps into our lives that may trigger GDPR article 22. “The data 
subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, 
including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him 
or her.” 
 “Processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of Union or Member 33
State law”. “processing is necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for the 
assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social 
care or treatment or the management of health or social care systems and services on the basis of Union 
or Member State law”. 
 Convention 108 Article 5 (3) & the Charter article 8 (2). Also, GDPR recital 40.34
 Granic M.-Antunovic K., Journal of Swiss Chinese Law Review Issue No.1, pp.14-17.35
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Chapter Two: COVID-19 case and the legal treatment 
The year 2020, is historically marked by the dominance of COVID-19, worldwide. An 
extreme situaEon that changed the flow of history, normality and rouEne of physical 
and legal persons globally. It is considered as a force majeure situaEon and in those 
situaEons the balancing for everyday’s decision gains ground. The World Health 
OrganizaEon (WHO) faced a holisEc health threat, that sEll is highly contagious aker 
almost one year, and is declared, from the beginning, to be as a pandemic .  36
2.1 What was the data protec2on problem that COVID-19 caused? 
Something had to be done, for facing the emergency. There were two levels that 
should be faced: the prevenEon of disease’s spread and the treatment of data 
protecEon during that pandemic. COVID-19 health case, became easily a poliEcal case 
and a great challenge for the Governments, that had the heavy duty to control the 
spread of the disease, a spread with high speed and protect the health of ciEzens. 
Governments though, had the duty to respect democracy and of course the duty to 
respect the data protecEon right, which right was highly affected  by the acEons 37
decided against the spread of pandemic.   
As is commonly accepted, no human right is superior than life. No human right can 
prevent saving lives, when have to be adopted measures that cause derogaEon of 
these rights. This derogaEon, though, applies, regarding the below severe and Eght 
condiEons:  
a. The restricEon shall a be short-term situaEon and  
b. only to the minimum level needed , in order not leading to abuse of human rights.  38
The puzzle to be solved is, as a ma+er of fact, acrobaEcs in a Eghtrope: The fully 
without suspension respect of personal data protecEon, especially the “sensiEve” 
 https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/ 36
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ones, against the uncontrolled flow/situaEon of a definitely contagious and potenEally 
fatal disease. And the resoluEon of this problem is given legislaEvely. 
2.2 The Legal Treatment, the predic2on in general 
In all legal texts regarding personal data protecEon, that are already menEoned above, 
is declared, that the data process shall be achieved “only if necessary, specified, 
proporEonate and with legiEmate purpose pursued”. Otherwise, if these principles are 
ignored, the vicEms of the pandemic will be two, in the end of the day: both human 
beings and privacy and data protecEon rights.  
The quesEon that comes first is what kind of data is crucial for facing and dealing with 
COVID-19. Answering to that quesEon, we have to examine two GDPR principles: 
a. the purpose limitaEon, together with  
b. the minimizaEon of data processing .  39
Throughout this thesis, the reference to data includes both simple and special 
categories data. But, COVID-19 data are, certainly, health data, meaning mostly special 
category data. These kinds of data concern authoriEes at the most, trying to find 
soluEon for miEgaEng the risk from COVID-19 collecEon and process that is needed. 
Health data is not the only category that is processed in that health ba+le. Also, 
geolocaEon data about paEents, human contacts, data for movement, maybe data 
generated and exported from small devices of their owner like device’s IP, emails etc, 
are collected and being processed.  
All these data, either simple or special category, need to be lawfully and transparently 
processed. The reason and purpose of the process shall be stated to data subjects and 
when the purpose has been served, data, mostly health, have to be deleted, due to 
certain protocol, or anonymized for medical or scienEfic reason. Though, it is declared 
in GDPR that, special data in parEcular, can by no means be processed, there is a 
limitaEon to that right.  
 Purpose Limitation implies “data collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes… further 39
processing for archiving purposes in the public interest…”. 

Data minimization implies that only “adequate, relevant & limited to what is necessary to the purposes for 
which they are processed”

Rücker D./Kugler T., New European General Data Protection Regulation, 2018, BECK-HART-NOMOS, pp.
49-67.
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The predicEon of suspension data protecEon right, is first faced in 1966. The 
InternaEonal Covenant on Civil and PoliEcal Rights  , in ArEcle 4, predicted that “1 . In 40
Eme of public emergency which threatens the life of the naEon and the existence of 
which is officially proclaimed, the States ParEes to the present Covenant may take 
measures derogaEng from their obligaEons…”. The same direcEon follows the 
European ConvenEon on Human Rights , which in the arEcle 15 are menEoned the 41
derogaEons on human rights that shall be occurred in Eme of emergency. Also, the 
ECHR implies, in arEcle 35, the high level of human life protecEon. 
In all those cases, the condiEons for suspension of human rights are:  
a.the short-term applicaEon of the derogaEon from obligaEons,  
b.the proporEonate derogaEons in order to be only the minimum needed for the case 
of emergency.  
Finally, in GDPR recitals 46 and 52, it is directly referred to data processing necessary 
for “humanitarian purposes, including for monitoring epidemics and their spread” and 
also directly referred to “DerogaEng from the prohibiEon on processing special 
categories of data” and how this is allowed. Also, in recital 159 GDPR is implied, that 
data process is allowed for scienEfic and research reasons, as long as this process 
follows protocols and good pracEces and always in relaEon with the arEcle 89 GDPR . 42
Aker all, the core GDPR principles lead to the major Principle of Accountability of data 
controller (and processor).  
2.3 Specific Legal Treatment in COVID-19 era 
The evoluEon of COVID-19 and the “ruins” that has lek globally, has triggered the 
legislaEve machinery of new legislaEon. All States, from the appearance of the disease, 
have issued specific legal texts, joint decisions, newly issued laws facing and trying to 
control the outrageous COVID-19 case. All these legal texts rely on the technological 
assistance, meaning AI methods, through which authoriEes are able to collect and 
process data, as an interim measure, for facing emergency, unEl a rescue vaccine will 
be found.  
 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Professionalinterest/ccpr.pdf 40
 https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf 41
 GDPR Chapter 9 - Art. 89 Safeguards and derogations relating to processing for archiving purposes in 42
the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes.
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Below, will be analyzed some of the new “COVID-19” methods that are conducted, 
Methods that are implied by laws, as the contact tracing, the collecEon of health data, 
the messages sent to the authoriEes in order humans to be permi+ed to do basic 
duEes like going to market or for a walk in quaranEne days etc. These methods that 
help authoriEes to their effort miEgaEng COVID-19 health risks, have two faces: effort 
for the mankind rescue, on the one side, and their “bad face” is the conceal of dangers 
for breach of data protecEon right, either by human intervenEon or by the States 
themselves.     
Apart from the above menEoned general provisions of GDPR or other legal 
frameworks, the permission of suspension and the limitaEon of data protecEon right is 
directed by specific guidelines and statements from EDPB and from naEonal DPAs, that 
have been released. These insEtuEons aker all, showed their worries about the 
present unprecedented situaEon, from the first Eme of the health out bushed.  
On 19th of March 2020, EDPB released a “Statement on the processing of personal 
data in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak” . In that Statement is declared, that 43
protecEon of data is not an obstacle for prevenEon of that contagious disease, which 
prevenEon consists high level priority, aker all. Despite that, the Statement underlines 
the necessity of data controller (and data processor, or any other form as joint 
controllers/processors), to process data due to the principle of lawfulness. Moreover, 
it underlines, that GDPR offers legal basis for data processing during the emergency, 
referring to a specific cases as health data processing by public health sectors due to 
ar8cles 6 and 9 GDPR, as employees’ data processing by the employers, as data 
process by telecommunicaEons due to ar8cle 15 of the relevant, and Lex Specialis, e-
Privacy Direc8ve and as the “mobile locaEon data”. That Statement also, seeks the 
answer to the quesEon, whether MS’s governments “can use personal data related to 
individuals’ mobile phones, in efforts to monitor, contain or miEgate the spread of 
COVID-19” and reminds the core principles of GDPR .  44
This Statement is considered, by the author of this wriEng, as an ulEmate cry out for 
not breaching GDPR, in the name of the effort controlling COVID-19. UlEmate and vain, 
author could add, because it is a common secret that no Laws can saEsfactory protect 
 https://epdb.europa.eu/our-documents/outros/statement-processing-personal-data-context-covid-19-43
outbreak_en. 
 article 5 (3)-(4), article 7 and 10 GDRP.44
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any kind of data, during such emergencies. It is also a reminder and an anxiety, that 
there is only a Eny red line that divides the permi+ed and lawful process of data 
(simple and special category) from the data breach, that cannot be finally avoided.  
A month aker publishing the above Statement, EDPB issued two more Guidelines, for 
specific processes. The first Guideline is 03/2020, “on the processing of data 
concerning health for the purpose of scienEfic research in the context of the COVID-19 
outbreak”, and the second is 04/2020 “on the use of locaEon data and contact tracing 
tools in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak”, both were adopted at the same date, 
on 21 April 2020  and are considered crucial Guidelines for process “sensiEve” data 45
and simple data. 
As it was expected, similar Statements were issued, at the same Eme, by the naEonal 
DPAs. For instance, in Greece on 18th of March 2020, the Greek DPA issued Guidelines 
for personal data process during COVID-19 . These Guidelines is a remind to the data 46
controllers, that GDPR is in acEon and is not suspended because of pandemic. That 
data processing shall obey certain lawful purposes, data protecEon right is not absolute 
and for that reason must be balanced when needed due to proporEonality test, and 
finally offer some instrucEons for employers and journalists for data process. Greek 
DPA in fact, retains a very acEve role, in data protecEon during the spread of COVID-19, 
and has already published many texts. Worth menEoning is, the on 04 of April 2020 
decision no 05/2020  and on 15th of April 2020 Guidelines for remote working, the 47
creaEon of a special portal  in Hellenic DPA site, for issues arising from data process in 48
COVID-19 era, and has examined pracEces as the Passenger Locator Form (PLF)  or the 49
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applicaEons. Of course, in every country, DPAs manage to issue relevant Guidelines and 
Statements . 50
Remarkable is the “Statement on derogaEons from the Covenant in connecEon with 
the COVID-19 pandemic” that Human Rights Commi+ee of United NaEons released on 
24th of April 2020  and also the previous one, in the beginning of pandemic arEcle of 51
 https://lsts.research.vub.be/en/data-protection-law-and-the-covid-19-outbreak-archive?50
fbclid=IwAR1X_MGiJ-cvFlnBAMBduLb6NEQpRO68nerm9Ce0W1bfpD3XhNJP9D6ox7I 
 “The Committee is of the view that in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, States parties must take 51
effective measures to protect the right to life and health of all individuals within their territory and all those 
subject to their jurisdiction, and it recognizes that such measures may result in certain circumstances in 
restrictions on the enjoyment of individual rights guaranteed by the Covenant. Furthermore, the 
Committee acknowledges that States parties confronting the threat of widespread contagion may resort, 
on a temporary basis, to exceptional emergency powers and invoke their right of derogation from the 
Covenant under article 4, provided this is required to protect the life of the nation. Still, the Committee 
wishes to remind States parties of the requirements and conditions laid down in article 4 of the Covenant 
and explained in the Committee’s General Comments, most notably in General Comment 29 on States of 
Emergency (2001), which provides guidance on the following aspects of derogations: (1) official 
proclamation of a state of emergency; (2) formal notification to the Secretary General of the UN; (3) strict 
necessity and proportionality of any derogating measure taken; (4) conformity of measures taken with 
other international obligations; (5) non-discrimination; and (6) the prohibition on derogating from certain 
non-derogable rights. In particular, States parties must observe the following requirements and conditions 
when exercising emergency powers in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic:

(a)Where measures derogating from the obligations of States parties under the Covenant are taken, the 
provisions derogated from and the reasons for the derogation must be communicated immediately to the 
other States parties through the Secretary-General of the UN (…) 

(b)Derogating measures can deviate from the obligations set out by the Covenant only to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the public health situation (…)

(c)States parties should not derogate from Covenant rights or rely on a derogation made when they can 
attain their public health or other public policy objectives through invoking the possibility to restrict 
certain rights, such as article 12 (freedom of movement), article 19 (freedom of expression) or article 
21(the right to peaceful assembly), in conformity with the provisions for such restrictions set out in the 
Covenant, or through invoking the possibility of introducing reasonable limitations on certain rights, such 
as article 9 (right to personal liberty) and article 17 (right to privacy), in accordance with their provisions. 

(d)States parties cannot resort to emergency powers or implement derogating measures in a manner that 
is discriminatory, or which violates other obligations they have undertaken under international law, 
including under other international human rights treaties from which no derogation is allowed. Nor can 
States parties deviate from the non-derogable provisions of the Covenant  - i.e., article 6 (right to life), 
article 7 (prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, or of medical or scientific 
experimentation without consent), article 8, paragraphs 1 and 2 (prohibition of slavery, slave-trade and 
servitude), article 11 (prohibition of imprisonment because of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation), 
article 15 (the principle of legality in the field of criminal law), article 16 (the recognition of everyone as a 
person before the law), and article 18 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) - or from other rights 
which are essential for upholding the non-derogable rights found in the aforementioned provisions and for 
ensuring respect for the rule of law and the principle of legality even in times of public emergency, 
including the right of access to court, due process guarantees and the right of victims to obtain an 
effective remedy.

(e)In addition, States parties cannot derogate from their duty to treat all persons, including persons 
deprived of their liberty, with humanity and respect for their human dignity, and they must pay special 
attention to the adequacy of health conditions and health services in places of incarceration, as well as to 
the rights of individuals in situations of confinement, and to the aggravated threat of domestic violence 
arising in such situations.(…)

(f) Freedom of expression, access to information and a civic space where a public debate can be held 
constitute important safeguards for ensuring that States parties resorting to emergency powers in 
connection with the COVID-19 pandemic comply with their obligations under the Covenant. 
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UN experts (United NaEon of Human Rights) with the Etle “COVID-19: States should 
not abuse emergency measures to suppress human rights” . 52
Chapter Three: COVID-19 case’s pillars: the specific processes of personal 
and their legal grounds. How the new Schrems II decision affects the 
processes. 
In the first two Chapters, we had the opportunity to review the topic in general, in 
reference to a lawful limitaEon of data protecEon right. This Chapter is dedicated to a 
further analysis of specific processes, in order to recognize the processes that were 
selected from experts, by laws, due to the effort controlling the pandemic. To find out 
what is the exact problem and esEmate legal basis, if any. Since we have derogaEon 
and limitaEon of human rights, at least it shall be lawful. Because even in this era, 
GDPR conEnue to be in force . Finally, we have to consider a new entry issue: we 53
depend our jobs or educaEonal system on internet and we use cloud methods, so 
many data transfers are conducted, especially towards third countries. On the other 
hand we have Schrems II decision, that revoked Privacy Shield in data transfer outside 
EU umbrella, so we have to consider whether this decision affects these data 
processes. Are the platorms that we use safe or/and legal? What we should do to 
supplement the gabs created? 
3.1 The tools that selected against COVID-19 spread and their legal basis 
The tools, against pandemic, are outlined as follows: 
a.Remote work, in order to miEgate the risk of the disease spread 
 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25722&LangID=E 52
 IAPP member site, Fazlioglu M., “Privacy in the Wake of COVID-19: Remote Work, Employee Health 53
Monitoring and Data Sharing”. 
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b.Contact tracing / Mobile tracking, in order to find out, where is the most infected 
environment. 
c.Distant educaEon and 
d.Health data process for the same reasons as above. 
The processed data during the usage of these tools, are mostly health data, meaning 
special category. For examinaEon whether GDPR is applied, data shall be either 
automated processed or be part of filing system . 54
In general, the legal basis of these data processes, regarding their nature, can be 
found : 55
a. either in ArEcle 9 par. 2, GDPR  56
b. or -for simple data - in ArEcle 6 para. 1, GDPR .  57
These extended methods may need high assessment before selecEon. Assessment and 
balancing between privacy, data and other rights’ protecEon, e.g. the right and free of 
movement, and the public interest and public health protecEon. Finally, we have 
always to pay extremely a+enEon to the not always granted principle of data and 
purpose minimizaEon, which shall be dominated. 
 Article 2 para.1 GDPR.54
 Tintzoglidou N., “Practical GDPR Guide”, 2020, p.22855
 b.processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and exercising specific 56
rights of the controller or of the data subject in the field of employment and social security and social 
protection law in so far as it is authorised by Union or Member State law or a collective agreement 
pursuant to Member State law providing for appropriate safeguards for the fundamental rights and the 
interests of the data subject; e.processing relates to personal data which are manifestly made public by 
the data subject; h.processing is necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for 
the assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or 
social care or treatment or the management of health or social care systems and services on the basis of 
Union or Member State law or pursuant to contract with a health professional and subject to the 
conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 3; i.processing is necessary for reasons of public 
interest in the area of public health, such as protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or 
ensuring high standards of quality and safety of health care and of medicinal products or medical 
devices, on the basis of Union or Member State law which provides for suitable and specific measures to 
safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular professional secrecy;
 c.processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; d. 57
processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural 
person; e.processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the 
exercise of official authority vested in the controller.
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a. REMOTE WORK 
To miEgate the spread of disease, humanity globally was set in a quaranEne period. 
Private and public sector, more than 90% of them, started the use of the unique and 
ulEmate choice, to work remotely, from home mostly. The subsequence of that was 
the extremely high amount of distant data process, which enlarge the danger of 
incidents.  
In Europe at least, all public organizaEons and private undertakings started considering 
the provisions of GDPR, examining the purpose limitaEon and the lawful principle. 
QuesEons arose, as which is the right purpose for the selected measure or whether 
existed an other - safer measure they had to consider, whether teleworking was 
adequate, proper, specific measure.  
Teleworking is considered a work plan , through technological devices and informaEon 58
technology systems, in the field of a work contract in distance, meaning without 
physical appearance to the working place that should be offered . But what really is 59
the risk taken, working from home? Why this way of working might be considered as 
extremely hazard in data protecEon field? 
Working from home may be dangerous for the protecEon of personal data, not only 
employees’ or employers’ data, but also the data of clients, vendors etc. Data are 
totally unfenced, because COVID-19 was an unexpected fact and the procedures were 
not set. Only a few enormous, and mulEnaEonal enEEes have the ability to miEgate 
the risk of any kind of data breach incident, that would cause harm to integrity, 
availability and confidenEality of data processed at home, remotely. Special categories 
of data also are exposed.  
From what? First of all, from the violaEon and hacking through internet provider, 
because at home there is no professional internet connecEon, that is costly. The lines 
are unprotected and any hacker would intrude to the line stealing precious files. 
 Koronaios Ai., Taxheaven, Article for Remote Working in pandemic era- Cybercrime and personal data, 58
https://www.taxheaven.gr/circulars/33745/arora-thlergasia-en-kairw-pandhmias-kybernoegklhma-kai-
proswpika-dedomena 
 Koukiadis I., “Labour Law”, version 8th, 2017, Sakkoulas,pp. 304-307.59
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Remote work also may means paper work, not only web work. Paper work means also 
many precious data accessible by the whole family.  
It is worth menEoning that, in case of cybercrime, all the three principles of 
cybersecurity -integrity/ availability / confidenEality- are violated. For that reason, 
arEcles 24 (1), 28 and 32 GDPR shall be strictly followed, and “appropriate technical 
and organizaEonal measures” shall be applied .  60
A protected and with standards remote work  prerequisites huge amount of expenses 61
for building a strong VPN system, customized for each employee, back-ups regularly, 
encrypEon and locked systems that can be unlocked only using dual authenEcaEon, 
good internet connecEon for business and not the simple home connecEon, devices 
that are lawfully controlled and monitored from employers, installaEon of firewalls/ 
anEvirus/ original sokwares that are up to date, new clauses for confidenEality that 
would supplement the exisEng contracts of the employees and all these must be 
followed by data controllers and processors as well.  
Scholars and researchers believe that this period a largest in history cybera+ack can 
happen . 62
Apart from what is already menEoned, issues arises the employees surveillance by the 
employer. Years ago, in 2017, before the transformaEon of Working Party ArEcle 29 
(WP29) to EDPB, an Opinion 2/2017 was released, concerning the data process at 
work . In that Opinion, it is menEoned the “Monitoring of home and remote working”, 63
it is underlined the risk of such decision for both the data of employers and also the 
data that employees process while working remotely. Also, it is esEmated, that any 
exaggeraEng surveillance from the employer upon the employee, is not likely to have 
as legal basis any legiEmate interest of the employer. For instance, there is no 
legiEmate interest for the employer to monitor the employee’s way of living while 
 Recital: 83, 74, 75, 76, 77 and in case of breach administrative fine: Art. 83 (4) lit a60
 Read ENISA’s PRESS RELEASE “Tips for cybersecurity when working from home The EU Agency for 61
Cybersecurity shares its top tips for teleworking in times of Covid-19”, Published on March 24, 2020, 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/tips-for-cybersecurity-when-working-from-home 
 MacBride St., the FORBES https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenmcbride1/2020/05/14/why-the-62
largest-cyberattack-in-history-will-happen-within-six-months/amp/?fbclid=IwAR3EvgBB2Qy-
h33B49ck1c-KTg_-RiKrS9zdB4_7zykCI73WFm1VecvPdAE . “…The more devices connected to a 
network, the larger its attack surface grows, making it easier for hackers to infiltrate the network. In short, 
each new device is a gateway where hackers can find vulnerabilities in and use it to wreak havoc on your 
system…”
 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=610169 63
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working from home, whether he chats through personal emails or to phone calls or if 
there is someone else at home or the place where s/he lives etc.  
Naturally, it is compaEble and imposed that employer shall protect the employees, 
meaning in emergencies there shall be allowed the process of employees’ any kind of 
data. In many European, as Italy, Germany, France, it is accepted by DPAs. But this 
process has a limit, and this is the prohibited violaEon of privacy and non-controlled 
process of data.  
The Greek DPA, on the 15th of April 2020, published the Guidelines for security in 
remote work . These guidelines deal with anything, that may cause risk for data 64
breach, while working without having physical appearance in the place of the work. 
These Guidelines aim to raise awareness of data controllers and processors regarding 
data protecEon, to impose certain policies and procedures for remote working, to train 
both employers and employees but also data subjects. These recommendaEons 
include the necessary remote access to files and desktop, e.g. VPN network, cloud 
services that are not appropriate, e.g. Dropbox/Google Drive etc., communicaEon 
through emails, that are professional and not home accounts, and teleconference that 
shall be encrypted as a measure provided against the risks. Aker all encrypEon is one 
of the two technological measures for security, proposed directly by GDPR, while there 
is no other choice provided. 
In the noEon of remote work, we face also the remote surveillance of the employees 
from their employers , that was totally banned and is already known since 1980  65 66
through CCTV or sokware downloaded to employees devices (PCs), but now is 
happening with further ways. Remarkable is, the obligaEon of security of remote 
worker privacy against any surveillance due to the DirecEve 90/270 that lead to arEcle 
5 GDPR and the principle of proporEonality.  
Formal noEficaEon of the employees from the employer, is needed, where the specific 
purposes for such surveillance shall be analyzed. That may happen through the 
supplement provisions in exisEng contracts and the context is what arEcles 13 and 14 
 https://www.dpa.gr/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/APDPX/HOME/FILES/64
KATEFTHINTIRIES%20GRAMMES_TILERGASIA.PDF 
 Igglezakis I, “Surveilance and Monitoring of electronic communication in workplace” DIMEE 1/2005, p.65
55.
 Douka V., “The personal data protection in dependent work”, 2011, pp.182-191.66
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GDPR imply. NoEficaEon leads to transparency in the above data process, but also 
policies and procedures are needed, proving the accountability of data controllers and 
processors. 
Finally seeking for the legal basis, that remote control shall be relied on, it can probably 
be: 
a.the law and the provision that allow or implement remote control e.g. up to 40%,  
b.the contract and the special clauses that shall be added  or  67
c.the legiEmate interest of the employer. In the last case, there shall be a data 
protecEon impact assessment, as arEcle 35 GDPR implies. For instance, if a special 
sokware shall be downloaded to employee’s device that collects any kind of data, 
while remote working, or if s/he accepted from employer a device that may collect 
geographical or health employ’s data, this technique shall be examined, balanced and 
can be followed only if passes the proporEonality test. Elsewhere it shall be considered 
as illegal process and rejected as such.  
Naturally, employees' consent cannot be legiEmate basis for any process conducted by 
employers, for the simple reason that an employee can never provide her/his consent 
“freely, specific, informed and unambiguous” . 68
b. CONTACT TRACING/MOBILE TRACKING  69
The most crucial process, that is followed during COVID-19, and has already occupied 
many scholars and experts, is contact tracing  devices and applicaEons. It is a 70
“Orwellian nightmare”, like a UN expert said. Contact tracing is crucial, because of the 
States penetraEon to the human rights. Naturally, the speed of the disease’s spread has 
approached that level, and only with such method authoriEes could recognize the alert 
areas, where there is high level infected and imply stricter measures. Regardless of that 
 Clauses both for employees information -due to articles 13 & 14 GDPR, about the data processes that 67
may occurred and the technological methods that may be follows- and confidentiality clauses as well.
 Article 7 specified further in recital 32 of the GDPR.68
 Also known as “Proximity Tracing” apps.69
 People who have been in close contact (according to criteria to be defined by epidemiologists) with an 70
individual infected with the virus run a significant risk of also being infected and of infecting others in turn. 

Contact tracing is a disease control methodology that lists all people who have been in close proximity to 
a carrier of the virus so as to check whether they are at risk of infection and take the appropriate sanitary 
measures towards them. 
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necessity, though, it is the most aggressive process and monitoring method of data, 
that, aker that procedure, are not considered personal any more. 
That process was urged by WHO, in order to track and monitor probable vicEms of 
COVID-19 . That method also implied by “Joint European Roadmap toward liking 71
COVID-19 containment measures” , by the European Council and the European 72
Commission on 15th April 2020 and also by the European Center for Disease 
PrevenEon and Control (ECDC). EDPB has expressed the opinion that the legal 
framework that operates data protecEon is so flexible, in order to both help controlling 
the pandemic and to protect fundamental human rights as well . In mt view  the 73
above declaraEon is only for camouflaging the truth that is, by this way -that is not 
considered as producEve- data protecEon dismissed in favor of public health. 
SEll, how easy or granted is that EDPB’s belief for data protecEon? Is this belief realisEc 
through that kind of process? The dangers that are hidden behind contact tracing, are 
who may process subjects’ data, even worse special category data, how they process 
them, for how long and where the selected data are transferred. There shall be 
appropriate safeguards and cybersecurity. The Supreme Court of U.S.A in Carpenter vs. 
U.S. case, had another opinion : “Mapping a cell phone’s locaEon (for an extended 74
period) provides an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts. As with GPS 
informaEon, the Eme-stamped data provides an inEmate window into a person’s life, 
revealing not only his parEcular movements, but through them his familial, poliEcal, 
professional, religious and sexual associaEons”. 
The way this technological method works, is by downloading an applicaEon to smart 
devices, like mobile phone or smart watch or any smart device, and when this device 
with the certain app is approximated to a vicEm, less than a meter distance, and if that 





 Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of location data and contact tracing tools in the context of the 73
COVID-19 outbreak Adopted on 21 April 2020, EDPB, p.3
 www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf 74
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import signs and noEficaEons. By that way, infected people will be isolated for the 
period of Eme that may infect other . 75
The condiEons for operaEng this method is that anyone -and furthermore the vicEm 
itself- has to download that app or possesses that kind of smart device, because 
without these condiEons, contact tracing is not possible. One more condiEon for 
operaEng that process is the vicEm has been tested and found medically to be a vicEm, 
otherwise again that method does not work . 76
This kind of procedure collects and process two kinds of data:  
a.LocaEon data, that are mostly anonymized. Anonymized data stand outside the scope 
of GDPR, but it stands upon the scope of E-Privacy DirecEve , to the level that locaEon 77
data are collected by telecommunicaEon providers. SomeEmes though, locaEon data 
cannot be fully anonymized, and in that case there is applicaEon of GDPR provisions.  
Either way, the download of this applicaEon is relied on users’ consent as a legal basis. 
That means there cannot be an obligaEon or implementaEon for downloading the app 
of this app or the possess of smart device. Also, nobody can impose the health 
examinaEon, in regular basis, of persons  who may be considered as asymptomaEc. 
That process works only in a freely voluntary basis. Law or employment contracts or 
even worse the legiEmate interest of data controller/processor, cannot be the legal 
basis for a data subject to download the applicaEon. 
 Abeler J, Bäcker M, Buermeyer U, Zillessen H, “COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Data Protection Can 75
Go Together”. JMIR Mhealth Uhealth 2020; 8(4). https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC7173240/ 

“…As soon as an app user is diagnosed with COVID-19, the doctor making the diagnosis asks the user 
to share their locally stored data with the central server (Figure 2). If the user complies, the central server 
receives information on all the temporary IDs the “infected” phone has been in contact with. The server is 
not able to decrypt this information in a way that allows for the identification of individuals. However, it is 
able to notify all affected phones. This is because the server does not need any personal data to send a 
message to someone’s phone. The server only needs a so-called PushToken, a kind of digital address of 
an app installation on a particular phone. This PushToken is generated when the app is installed on the 
user’s phone. At the same time, the app will send a copy of the PushToken, as well as the temporary IDs 
it sends out over time, to a central server. The server could be hosted, for example, by the Robert Koch 
Institute for Germany or by the National Health Service for the United Kingdom. This way, it would be 
possible to contact phones solely based on temporary IDs and PushTokens whilst completely preserving 
the privacy of the person using the phone…”
 https://www.homodigitalis.gr/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/76
HomoDigitalis_Report_COVID19_and_Digital_Rights_in_Greece_22.04.2020_Final.pdf 
 58/2002/EE first e-privacy directive.77
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b.The app also collects health data , through algorithms and that needs precauEon. 78
CollecEng health data, is based upon the legal basis given by arEcle 9(2)(j) GDPR, 
regarding data necessary for scienEfic research purposes or staEsEcal purposes. 
c.Finally, informaEon that stand in the owners device and is protected by ePrivacy 
DirecEve . 79
Contact tracing shall be designed by default. Again, there shall be a data protecEon 
impact assessment, as arEcle 35 GDPR sEpulates, because of the severity of the 
procedure and the risks that are assessed is high.  
The principles that shall apply is limitaEon of collecEng data storage, only for the 
COVID-19 duraEon, aker which period shall be either anonymized or deleted with 
special care and protocols. According to the author’s opinion is, that data selected by 
that kind of apps, consist atomic bomb in the hands of uncontrolled data controllers 
and processors.  
The main quesEon is, whether these apps are, finally, safe and effecEve for controlling 
COVID-19. It is declared, that there is no need to be known the details of specific users 
but only the geographical sEgma and the area maters, where many vicEms are 
concentrated. In the view of the author this is only the half truth. It s the half truth 
because, the COVID-19 vicEm, especially the non-symptomaEc, does not stay sEll in an 
area that is under surveillance. The “vicEm” may move to several direcEons and spread 
disease to dozens of her/his contacts. So, the most efficient way to monitor the disease 
would be the surveillance of the vicEms themselves. But this persons’ monitoring, 
means totally penetraEon to privacy to the maximum level, to the level of abuse and of 
course means the end of data protecEon, even for such sacred cause. That is the 
reason, why there is, at least, a need for a certain impact assessment to be recorded. 
What it has to be assessed  is: 80
a.the effecEveness towards the limitaEon of disease’s spread 
b.the voluntarily nature of the choice 
 Health data as the disease that subjects are infected of, the medicines they take, whether they were in 78
quarantine etc.
 Flett E., Gover R., “European Commission and the EDPB lay out framework for privacy-compliant 79
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c.the interim character of the measure 
d.the limitaEon of data storage 
e. The absence of profiling 
f. The limitaEon of purpose 
g, the descripEon of anonymized procedure. 
Due to severity of the specific process, there is a highly need of uniform and globally 
treatment of contact tracing, and not only in the EU area. As data controller shall be 
designated per each State centrally, for example the naEonal health authoriEes, 
because of the duty of accountability. But on the top of the local authoriEes, there has 
to be a global supervisor, with common guidelines. But that seems not to be possible, 
because of the difference of legal systems and perspecEves of the States . 81
Two of the first States, that brought this method to the table of the ba+le against 
pandemic, was Singapore and South Korea, in March 2020 . On 10th of April 2020, the 82
two giants, Google and Apple, made the announcement of the use of Bluetooth for 
tracing approximate devices’ users diagnosed posiEve to COVID-19 . In Europe there 83
was an iniEaEve, through the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing 
(PEPP-PT) , with the aim to safeguard privacy and prevent breaches. 84
Worth menEoning, is the posiEon towards these apps, of the Italian DPA, that was 
presented at a parliamentary hearing . The key points of the presentaEon was the 85
need for extremely voluntary basis, for limited storage and for less idenEfying 
 E.g. Sweden has other perspective towards pandemic than Greece.81
 https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/Covid-19%2Bcontact-82
tracing%2Bapps%2BCorona%2BPonce%2BPolicy%2BBrief%2B2020.05.pdf 
 https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/ehealth/docs/covid-19_apps_en.pdf & “https://83
www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/04/apple-and-google-partner-on-covid-19-contact-tracing- technology/ 
The announcement included the publication of three draft technical documents on Bluetooth and 
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informaEon, leading to the proposal of existence of specific statutory offenses in case 
of breach of the above condiEons.  86
To summarize, admission and selecEon of contact tracing technique towards the 
COVID-19 ba+le, is a topic that extremely bothered all States globally. The maximum 
legality and transparency is the requested. The free will of the ciEzens to give their 
consent for such an ambiguous process, depends on the confidence of the data 
subjects, that their privacy is safe. Confidence towards the States, that State confide 
certain experEse in order to build the policies and procedures for such a process, who 
have the certain experience to recognize the risks and miEgate them. Confidence 
towards the providers and constructors of such apps. Confidence towards the net 
either vpn that will connect the devices, in order not to be hackerized or breached. 
 Also see https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-coronavirus-pandemic-eu-86
bulletin-may_en.pdf “Alongside legislation, procedures to examine contact-tracing apps before their 
release and the involvement of authorities in their development can ensure their conformity with data 
protection principles and GDPR requirements (see Section 4.1.2 above on involvement of DPAs). In Italy, 
for example, the competent Ministry set up a task force of experts - including from the WHO and the 
national DPA (as observer) - to assess proposals for the development and authorisation of a contact-
tracing app.214 The Finnish parliamentary working group on information policy is involved in a process to 
underline data protection and privacy requirements in advance. In other Member States, other authorities 
are also consulted or involved in assessing the legality and/or efficiency of apps, such as the Attorney 
General in Ireland or the Ombuds institution in Croatia.215 However, media in Bulgaria, where the app is 
officially approved, noted that neither the authorities nor the developers of the app, submitted it for 
independent assessment of its data protection compliance.216 

In the majority of Member States, contact-tracing apps are based solely on the processing of Bluetooth 
proximity data, as the European Commission and the EDPB recommend (Austria, Czechia, Germany, 
Denmark, Estonia, Croatia, France, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Poland and Portugal). In Estonia, 
although the use of location data was discussed, the app will ultimately only process Bluetooth data.217 
However, apps in Bulgaria, Cyprus and Lithuania are based on network and/or GPS location data; in 
Slovakia the available app uses both Bluetooth and location data. 

Evidence confirms that contact-tracing apps mostly take a decentralised approach, with users’ data 
(such as keys, identifiers, etc) produced and stored locally on their devices (Austria, Cyprus, Germany, 
Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Poland and Portugal). In some Member States, authorities can have 
limited access to users’ data: in Estonia, Poland and Finland, users can voluntarily share their Bluetooth 
proximity data with health authorities.218 In Portugal, a user diagnosed with COVID-19 would have to 
authorise a health professional to share this data anonymously to warn others.219 However, in Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Czechia, France, Spain, Lithuania, Italy and Slovakia, contact-tracing apps use 
centralised, so-called ‘backend’, models where users’ data are stored and processed on a central server. 

The European Commission and EDPB do not specifically advocate either approach. The European 
Parliament, however, proposes the use of decentralised models by Member States.220 The choice 
between systems prompted much discussion amongst academia, NGOs and public authorities. These 
exchanges highlighted issues around the risk of function creep, identification of data subjects or 
vulnerability to cyberattacks, with centralised systems attracting particular concern.221 

Contact-tracing apps in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain (Basque region), Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Slovakia also include further health functionalities, such as symptom reporting, medical screening and 
communication with health authorities. For example in Denmark, the app informs users if their COVID-19 
test is positive.222 The app available in Lithuania enables daily coronavirus symptom tracking, and the 
receiving of health advice and information. In Austria, a draft law would allow voluntary screening 
functionalities to be added to the existing contact-tracing app to enable users to transmit personal and 
health data to the health authority.223 Combining such functionalities in one app could lead to ‘function 
creep’. The European Commission stresses that users should be able to provide their consent separately 
for each of an app’s functionalities. In Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, 
different apps are available for processing and communicating health data.”
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Confidence that this sacrifice of privacy will be Eme limited only for the pandemic era 
and not forever . 87
Consent, without established confidence that data subjects are safe, will never be 
given. Because, data subjects can not tolerate more data process than needed. 
c.DISTANT EDUCATION 
“The UN Conven,on Commi/ee on the Rights of the Child set out in 2001, that Children 
do not lose their human rights by virtue of passing through the school gates. Educa,on 
must be provided in a way that respects the inherent dignity of the child and enables 
the child to express his or her views freely…” 
Social distancing is the best way for ruining the disease’s chain and eliminaEng present 
pandemic, with all the parameters this distance causes. We have already analyzed the 
remote work and we have concluded that the remote-mode shall be chosen for all 
human acEons. Of course, there is no educaEon, if it is distant. The aim of educaEon, 
from nursery to high school and universiEes as well, is mainly the socializing of young 
persons, in order to find the way to communicate with others, to work with them, to 
create relaEonships. In this emergency, socializaEon is the one needed less, not saying 
is not needed at all, as long as this isolaEon is considered as an interim measure and 
not permanent way of living.  
Most of the States, in a very short Eme limit, managed to qualify schools and 
universiEes to change their rouEne. While many States globally were set in quaranEne 
as a whole, pupils and students were being educated on line and in most countries that 
method has been conEnued aker quaranEne. Distant EducaEon means all pupils, 
students and teachers/professors have the ability, meaning the equipment for 
conducEng courses on line .  88
 Abeler J, Bäcker M, Buermeyer U, Zillessen H, “COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Data Protection Can 87
Go Together”. JMIR Mhealth Uhealth 2020; 8(4). https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC7173240/

“…The reason most frequently brought up against an installation is the worry that the government could 
use the app as an excuse for greater surveillance after the end of the epidemic. If the government wants 
as many people as possible to install the app, it should take these concerns seriously and refrain from 
using location data. Contact tracing works without it…”
 We are dealing with the on line education at the same time, not asynchronous distant education.88
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The prerequisite, for the right use of distant educaEon, is all of the parEcipants shall 
know, how to use electronically devices and how to be connected, but also means that 
the platorms and the devices can be compliant enough for protecEng data. Also 
means, that are being adopted technical and organizaEonal measures for data 
protecEon by laws (naEonal and GDPR).  
The data risk is larger, when the process concerns data subjects in sensiEve age, that is 
underaged pupils, teenagers and younger than the age of 13. 
The key elements, that have to be checked in distant educaEon are:  
a.that educaEonal system shall not financial burden children’s family,  
b.children are more prone to leave an improper “fingerprint” online and that risk has 
to be eliminated,  
c.children are mostly not aware of their rights  and shall be informed,  89
d.there is a high risk for profiling and also high risk for transfer of data in third 
countries, through the platorms used and shall be secure locks.  
Some of the risks, that are faced through distant educaEon are hacking pupils’ - 
students’ profile and accounts stealing material, the recording of the course by 
students or teachers and the usage of that material with any way possible, taking 
pictures of underaged persons and uploading them to illegal sites, strangers 
penetraEng the course and causing problems.  
RecommendaEons, Policies and Guidelines to educaEon authoriEes as data controllers, 
to vendors as data processors, to professors and to legal guardians of the children (if 
they are underaged) are given to a very useful “Drak for Children’s Data protecEon 
educaEon Systems” on 11th February 2020  by ConsultaEve Commi+ee of the 90
ConvenEon for the protecEon of individuals. For miEgaEng risks, caused by distant 
educaEon, in each State was conducted an effort to be selected the safest platorm. 
Among prerequisites and standards were that, through these platorms, would not be 
permi+ed the collecEon of sounds and images, there would be created locked classes 
with Eme limit, both students and teachers could mute and unmute (as well video in 
and out) when necessary.   
 Convention of the Rights of the Child 89
 https://rm.coe.int/t-pd-2019-06bisrev2-en-education-guidelines/16809c3c46 90
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The educaEonal platorms are in fact the highest problem, with several faces. One 
more problemaEc is that, in countries like Greece, the structure that is followed leads 
to a division of public and private educaEon. Data controller for public schools, in 
Greece e.g., is Ministry of EducaEon while controller for private schools is the legal 
person, who has the admission to operate, meaning the higher administraEon of 
private school itself from the competent authority . Because of this diversity/ 91
differenEaEon, we deal with several platorm choices, because each private school 
select different platorm and not the central platorm that was selected by Ministry of 
EducaEon. For that reason, private schools are not covered by the impact assessment 
that Ministry of EducaEon elaborated , but have to conduct their own, and mostly by 92
design and default. Most of private schools, have chosen also platorms that may be 
more student-friendly, but are high perforated, referring to cybersecurity or face the 
problem that was caused by Schrems II decision , that has not been solved up to 93
now . 94
Worth menEoned to that point, is the Greek’s DPA Opinion 4/2020 , for the DPIA 95
conducted by Greek Ministry of JusEce. That extremely long Opinion market the above 
DPIA’s problemaEcs and asked them to be corrected in a deadline of three months, 
that is expired. The DPIA was conducted in a short Eme because of the emergency, for 
that reason the gabs were many. The major fault of the above DPIA, though, is that is 
presented to be approved by Ministry’s DPO, who had no such responsibiliEes and 
duEes by GDPR. 
The principles that dominaEng distant educaEon, are again the implicaEon of lawful 
data process, limitaEon of purpose and of data storage and of course transparency 
needed through certain policies, procedures and noEficaEons from the chair of 
schools/ universiEes to teachers/ professors, students and legal guardians, when 
 Of course, the processor is the provider of the selected platform.91
 https://www.minedu.gov.gr/publications/docs2020/Μελέτη_Εκτίμησης_Αντικτύπου_rsz.pdf 92
 see below Level 2.93
 It is expected that up to December 2020, EDPB will release guidances and there is a standard 94
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students are underaged. The legal basis in these processes is either the law, arEcle 6 (1) 
(c) GDPR, in connecEon with the exercise of official authority of the controller, arEcle 6 
(1) (e) GDPR or the consent, arEcle 6 (1) (a) GDPR, provided by students or their legal 
guardians -where underaged pupils .  96
d.HEALTH DATA PROCESSING 
During the period from the breaking point of pandemic’s outbreak, the highlights were 
directed towards the health sector and the data that should be collected. Especially, 
the sensiEve or the special category data. The European Union Agency for 
Cybersecurity, ENISA, has menEoned health sector has become “direct target or 
collateral vicEm of cybersecurity a+acks” .  97
Health data  collecEon and process is the main target of many procedures followed 98
this period, as the above menEoned contact tracing or even remote work. Some new 
entry procedures have been recently adopted by public organizaEons and private 
enEEes, as thermal cameras, drones for infected person’s surveillance, naEonal health 
catalogue.  
Apart from drone surveillance that it is collected mainly pictures and sounds, and 
seems not to be supported by any legal basis, so it is considered as unlawful data 
processing, the other procedures can be selected by authoriEes, as long as no data or 
only anonymized data are kept, either automated processed or in filing system and 
only for the purpose needed . E.g. the material that thermal cameras collect, meaning 99
the temperature of the passengers, shall not be kept or shall be anonymized if it is filed 
and saved. As far as the naEonal health catalogue, the elements shall be anonymized 





 “According to Article 4 (15) GDPR, “data concerning health” means “personal data related to the 98
physical or mental health of a natural person, including the provision of health care services, which reveal 
information about his or her health status”. As indicated by Recital 53, data concerning health deserves 
higher protection, as the use of such sensitive data may have significant adverse impacts for data 
subjects. In the light of this and the relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”),4 the 
term “data concerning health” must be given a wide interpretation. “
 Article 9 (2) GDPR99
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It is a verEcal change of the rouEne in our lives. Some examples that we experience 
every day are, the need to complete quesEonnaire for visiEng gym or public services 
with quesEons -whether we feel certain symptoms, that WHO recognizes as COVID-19, 
or whether we have traveled to suspicious for COVID-19 spread counEes etc. The need 
of undergoing temperature control before entrance for instance Courts or other 
enEEes. The need to express to children’s school whether there are persons with 
vulnerabiliEes in order children not to be physically present in class but a+end 
distantly. These examples and many other that we pracEce lately, expose everyday our 
health data to innumerable amount of people. We have no informaEon about almost 
nothing, where are these sensiEve data kept, for how long, where are they transferred. 
Are we going to have any problem in the future because of our disclosure of data, for 
instance are we going to enjoy health insurance or insurance companies have access to 
naEonal health catalogue? These gabs have not been filled yet, even aker months from 
pandemic outburst and even aker all this legislaEve flood worldwide.  
Health data shall be processed for scienEfic purpose and research (“primary use”) but 
they may be collected for other reason (“secondary use”) . The legal basis for that 100
process is the ArEcles 6 and 9 GDPR, depending in the process. Transparency and full 
disclosure of all informaEon needed , as well certain policies and procedures to be 101
conducted, that may add confidence to data subjects while facing such renovated 
methods.  
In this point, shall be menEoned the publicaEon of data, mostly health (as sensiEve) 
data. AuthoriEes shall publish the findings in order to prevent the disease spread. They 
shall do it anonymously, with numbers or proporEons that exist to any area. The extent 
of publicity is a point that arises many issues because of the sEgma that may causes. 
And that issue is not faced homogeneously by all DPAs, e.g. Irish DPC accept extended 
disclosure of data . DPAs safeguard personal data, especially when are processed 102
sensiEve data that data subject wants to hide, having the anxiety of a sEgma that might 
carry eternally. When, we talk about contradicEon between data and privacy 
 https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/100
edpb_guidelines_202003_healthdatascientificresearchcovid19_en.pdf 
 Article 13-14 GDPR.101
 Mitrou L. “Personal Data in times of COVID-19, Syntagma Watch www.syntagmawatch.gr/trending-102
issues/ta-prosopika-dedomena-stin-epoxi-tou-koronoiou/ 
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protecEon and the freedom of press and expression, we are referring to not absolute 
rights that shall be ad hoc balanced  103
3.2 How the new Schrems II decision affects the processes 
Worth menEoning is the new C-311/18 Decision Facebook Ireland and Maximillian 
Schrems, known as Schrems II decision . That Decision re-examined the Standard 104
Contractual Clauses (SCCs) and the previous Decision 2010/87/EE. These Clauses used 
to cover the lawful transfer of data towards third countries, meaning the place where 
GDPR does not apply.  
That decision enjoys unique importance, because many processes that are followed, 
during COVID-19 trying to resist pandemic’s consequences, depend on methods that 
indeed transfer out of E.U.. We are referring to platorms for distant educaEon, e.g. 
Google MeeEngs, teleconference for remote work, cloud compuEng for work as well 
for contact tracing etc. In parEcular, the contact tracing apps are relied on Apple/
Google system and the process conducEng through smart devices. 
Worth menEoned is the ArEcle 49  GDPR, which offers derogaEons for data transfer 105
to third countries as long as the transfer is:  
”- Explicitly consented by data subject 
- Necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the 
controller 
- Necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest 
of the data subject  
- Necessary for important reasons of public interest 
- Necessary for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims 
- Necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of other 
persons 
- Made from a register which according to Union or Member State law” 
The Schemes II Decision examined the Privacy-Shield Decision between EU and USA, 
and whether this Decision was adequate, for safe data transfer from EU to USA. The 
Privacy-Shield Decision Shield was finally, decided and judged as invalid hereaker. Due 
to ArEcle 46 GDPR, this kind of judgement affects data transfer in any third country. 
This decision sets in quesEoning the process, through platorms, for educaEonal or 
professional reasons or any cloud service dealing with data centers established outside 
EU, even if there are representaEves established in EU, as branches of mother enEEes. 
 Article 85 & recitals 4, 153, GDPR 103
 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-311/18 104
 https://www.privacy-regulation.eu/en/article-49-derogations-for-specific-situations-GDPR.htm 105
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The soluEon for this problem is:  
a.either data isolaEon that means that the enEEes will never collaborate with enEEes 
outside EU. They will be restricted within EU and that will harm the free movement of 
data, meaning the raEo of GDPR. 
b.or supplementary measures, that are needed for such data transfer, which transfer is 
unavoidable, if we want to work or do all the good pracEces, that we have done for so 
many years.  
These measures are going to be suggested with Guidelines that are expected by EDPB 
in December. There is conducted a public consultaEon (from 12 of November up to 
10th of December 2020) for the new drak for Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) for 
safe data transfer to third countries, and also “Frequently Asked QuesEons on the 
judgment of the Court of JusEce of the European Union in Case C-311/18 - Data 
ProtecEon Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems”  is 106
published . A former judgement of that SCCs drak is that there is a rather non specific 
text, with many gabs and so much documentaEon implied that may not be a realisEc 
choice for data transfers.  
We have to wait to examine if that drak will be changed in future. 
Chapter Four: Balancing test and the Principle of Propor2onality  
“Asking people to choose between privacy and health is, in fact, the very root of the 
problem. Because this is false choice. We can and should enjoy both privacy and 
health.” 
— Harari, Y.N. Financial Times, 22nd March 2020. 
We have examined, up to now, how data protecEon right is approached, through the 
new methods that came into our rouEne, struggling against COVID-19. How the 
restricEon of data protecEon right was predicted by laws, and how this limitaEon is 
nowadays a reality. Another quesEon that has to be solved, but sEll is not easy to be 
corresponded, is how data protecEon right can be balanced with other rights, as the 
right to health and to life and to public interest, what should we balance and what are 
the results esteemed. That high technique of balancing rights, prerequisites a profound 
 https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/filFrequently Asked Questions on the judgment of the Court of 106
Justice of the European Union in Case C-311/18 - Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd 
and Maximillian Schremses/files/file1/20200724_edpb_faqoncjeuc31118_en.pdf  
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data protecEon impact assessment, especially for the special categories of data and, 
also well establishment of the principle of proporEonality. 
4.1 Ar2cle 35 GDPR Data Protec2on Impact Assessment 
Privacy and dignity are goods/ rights that shall a free person enjoys in a free society. 
Public interest, public safety and health are goods, rights that shall all free persons 
enjoy in a free society. How can we balance these, somehow, contradicted rights that 
have the same weight?  
The free-from-coronafear and normal days, seem to be so far away, either as past 
memories or future expectaEons. It is considered as a luxury to cast an eye to data 
protecEon, while there is fear for health humanity worldwide. Yet, personal data, 
privacy, self-determinaEon shall be protected and have not lost their power, even at 
these strange moments.  
Public interest is a vague as legal concept. It is not specific but shall be specified and 
jusEfied by legal basis, in order to be protected, otherwise it may be examined by 
Courts, whether there was an abusive extension of that noEon . Public health is part 107
of public interest because public health direct affects public interest.  
EsEmaEng where the scales close, public interest vs data protecEon, a test is needed. 
And will be needed for a long Eme so we have to consider it as a new custom. That test 
can balance the contradicted rights ad hoc, in each process and at each Eme period. 
What shall be examined is:  
a.whether each process, that violates somehow subjects’ privacy or data protecEon, is 
the proper method or shall be selected other process that intrudes less into our lives, 
through a risk and impact assessment. And also,  
b.if the method is indeed the proper, whether the process is proporEonal or has 
exceed the limits, the proporEonate test, as it is called widely.  
That means pracEcally, that before choosing the method that helps minimizing the 
curve of COVID-19, experEses shall take into consideraEon the risks that are 
undertaken and carried by this method, if there are other methods that threaten less 
risks, and if these risks are proporEonate to the legiEmate purposes. The reason for 
 Panagopoulou - Koutnatzi, “Data Protection in pandemic times”, https://www.constitutionalism.gr/107
wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2020.03.28_Panagopoulou_privacycoronavirus.pdf?
fbclid=IwAR2BnMVMKA4bMToCNxQ2xoTMQal3yzpXY7gov-xYnolFclRsxLewjdjVx5o 
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that risk and impact assessment is because in many cases, when there is Eme pressure, 
the choices that are made are not correctly esEmated.  
Is there Eme for assessment? The answer is probably negaEve. Everyday missing is a 
bigger scale for COVID-19 vicEms or losses. Writer’s personal view is that, there can be 
no adequate Data ProtecEon Impact Assessment (DPIA), during pandemic, and the 
only quesEon, that is considered in fact is do we want to eliminate vicEms, whatever 
this means or do we want to protect data and privacy for the CoronaSurvivors? That 
conclusion can be very disappoinEng, because, if this way of thinking prevails, then the 
answer will definitely be, that we decide to save lives, with any cost. And that will 
pracEcally lead GDPR to be set aside. Governments and authoriEes have corona-faEgue 
and that is obvious and expected. COVID-19 doesn’t wait and scans everything in his 
path. Though, the situaEon cannot be an excuse for sezng aside the privacy or data 
protecEon. Some day, COVID-19 will pass but the sEgma for all the subjects, who have 
their data published, will remain, both for themselves and for their families. 
On the other hand, Robert Kirkpatrick, director of UN Global Pulse in 2018, declared 
that:  
"ethical decision-making requires minimizing not only the risk of data misuse, but also 
that of missed use, that is, of leaving crucial data resources untapped in the global fight 
against famine, plague and war."  
4. 2 DPIA examples 
Naturally, data leads to a be+er risk management. The soluEon for this problemaEc is 
that given in arEcle 35 GDPR . A DPIA shall be conducted for overall measures taken 108
during pandemic and not for each one, for not wasEng precious Eme tackling 
pandemic.  
For be+er understanding, there are some examples given , some processes that shall 109
be conducted a DPIA: 
 Article 35 (1) GDPR: “Where a type of processing in particular using new technologies, and taking into 108
account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the 
rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall, prior to the processing, carry out an 
assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data. A 
single assessment may address a set of similar processing operations that present similar high risks.”

In connection with Recital: 75, 84, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93

And administrative fine: Art. 83 (4) lit a
 Whitcroft O., “A guide to data processing during a pandemic”, p.2109
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• For collecEng health data, it must be assessed how many data are needed for what 
specific purpose. Competent authoriEes shall consider the principle of minimizaEon 
of purpose and data. Or collecEng health data for research it must be considered the 
anonymizaEon or pseudonimizaEon. There is essenEal an examinaEon of methods 
that are recommended for collecEng those data, that are processed and filed, and 
what is/are the legal basis for that process. 
• When there is a need for disclosure informaEon about COVID-19 paEents, within an 
enEty, it must be assessed whether there is need for disclosure names and other 
personal data. EnEEes have to consider technical measures GDPR recommends, as 
anonymity or pseudonymity and of course the legal basis.  
• When working or educaEng from home, shall be considered the cybersecurity 
methods needed and shall be assessed the impact of the platorm’s funcEon towards 
collecEon and process subject’s data. The risks that are at stake, shall be able to be 
recognized in order to be overcome and recovered, when they might be happened. 
In parEcular, for online (distant) educaEon, many scholars, associaEons (for example 
in Greece the AssociaEon of Private Schools) have the absolute opinion that no 
platorm is safe enough for that kind of educaEon and is not a proper way for online 
educaEon, at least for pupils of primary and nursery school. It should be selected 
other methods that would lead to the same results without risks, for instance 
educaEon that would not be provided in real Eme but asynchronous educaEon. 
Though, writer’s opinion is declined to that percepEon, Ministry’s (of EducaEon) DPIA 
was published, as it is above menEoned, and the conclusion was that kind of distant 
educaEon has minimum risks and is safe for pupils/ students. Of course Greek Data 
ProtecEon Authority was not totally convinced by that assessment and asked 
Ministry to supplement DPIA. And at this point is located, what causes ambiguity to 
parents, that are obliged to permit their children to parEcipate in distant educaEonal 
platorms. That is, the necessity to conduct processes very fast, and speed means 
gabs that are not filled. 
Since competent authoriEes esEmate, that methods taken in the present emergency 
are the proper and are used with the proper way, disclosure to data subjects as arEcle 
13 and 14 GDPR shall be available, due to principles of transparency and accountability 
for data controllers/ processors. It is granted, that such an intrusion to privacy and 
 PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA IN THE ERA OF COVID-19, 2020 Olga Tsiptse
42
personal life, demands the maximum respect of human’s dignity and that is provided 
through explanaEon.  
Humans shall know what is taking place in order to collaborate with authoriEes and 
State. 
Chapter Five: Conclusions  
Finally, is GDPR an obstacle for saving humanity from this pandemic and health crisis?  
Or, the necessity to control pandemic violates data protecEon, along with dignity and 
self-determinaEon? Data process in COVID-19 era, especially health data, may be 
lawful, through some safeguards, that GDPR or other specific provisions provide. 
Though, is it moral? 
5.1 COVID-19 vs personal data: The next day 
Personal data protecEon, in ages of emergency, has not the meaning of banning the 
public good and interest, as the public health. On the contrary, Recital 4 GDPR imposes 
the balance data protecEon right with the contradicted rights, based on the principle 
of proporEonality . By this lawful way, the Chair of the Commi+ee of ConvenEon 108, 110
Alessandra Pierucci, states, that restricEon in data protecEon is jusEfied “solely on a 
provisional basis and only for Eme explicitly limited to the state of emergency”.  
The above key elements are the prerequisites, for all processes, implied by the 
emergency, in order to be accepted, in the end of the day. The Eme limit that 
restricEons are going to have. What will be the next day though? Are we going to live 
eternally the way we have just learnt? How much Eme is this explicitly limited Eme? 
Beyond the limited-Eme condiEon, added value has the condiEon/ prerequisite of 
security, mostly cybersecurity, because the majority of the new selected processes are 
relied on internet. What are the safeguards for data process? What are the technical 
 Panagopoulou-Koutnatzi F., “Issues of constitutionality in distance school education”,Journal 110
Adm.Law 3/2020, pp. 292-303.
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measures that authoriEes, employers, school chairs, researchers etc have taken for 
safeguarding all this mass data that are being processed by them? 
Writer’s personal view is that, the doubts have not been eliminated. There is no 
complete and transparent informaEon about the above menEoned condiEons for 
decreased protecEon of personal data. The pressure of Eme and the anxiety, due to 
the danger to face a crash of health system, has prevailed upon the personal data 
protecEon, which has lowered priority level. There is an ethical porEon, that has been 
underesEmated and new technologies oken seem to invalidate or to violate principles 
for ethical process and use of these technologies, especially those who are relied on 
arEficial intelligence (AI).  
Aker all, it is stated in “Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI of the High-level Expert 
Group on AI” , that: 111
“trustworthy AI should be: 
(1) lawful -  respecEng all applicable laws and regulaEons 
(2) ethical - respecEng ethical principles and values 
(3) robust - both from a technical perspecEve while taking into account its social 
environment”  
Also, the above guidelines have seven requirements, among which, special a+enEon is 
given to the respect of data protecEon and the implicaEon of transparency. This 
transparency that is not granted nowadays. 
Since there is necessity to process data the following shall be confirmed: process and 
purpose shall be clear, accurate and transparent, there shall be only on certain legal 
basis, subjects’ rights are confirmed mostly the access to their data, there are 
measures for informaEon security, there must be certain Eme limits, impact 
assessments shall be conducted by default and by design. 
The menEoned condiEons, writer claims that, are not totally followed by authoriEes 
and finally, the “by design and by default” of processes, that could guarantee data 
protecEon, has not been fully completed, nor there is complete convicEon, that all the 
treatments analyzed above are required. For instance, contact tracing apps are not fully 
reliable and there is not efficient evidence for the proper collecEon and process of 
personal data.  
 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai 111
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On the contrary, contact tracing seems not to be an efficient measure against 
COVID-19, because that measure cannot effecEvely help towards the ba+le against 
crisis. Aker all, any user can withdraw her/his consent and delete the app from the 
device, also there is no Eme limit for the applicaEon and there is no confidence that 
data are fully anonymized, since profiling is conducted. 
Not all the new methods and technologies are needed during these tough Emes. The 
selecEons shall be tailored aker efficient balancing and risk / impact assessment and 
these decisions shall be revised in every stage of the evoluEon of the crisis. Also which 
data are useful for the ba+le against pandemic, is a decision that can be changed, 
depending on the flow of the disease and always regarding the principles of data and 
purpose minimizaEon, the principle of confidenEality and informaEon security. 
There has to be considered another point, that may causes adversiEes: as it is 
menEoned above, for contact tracing apps the owner of the device has to give her/his 
explicit consent. How, finally explicit and freely given is that consent? What will be 
happened if that owner withdraw that consent? What other legal basis will be selected 
or if that is impossible, what is plan B? Unfortunately, there is also no answer to that 
consideraEon. It is definitely a gab that will cause difficulEes, when AuthoriEes might 
use this kind of apps 
Aker all, do we have to sacrifice and hand over our data, with the unique jusEficaEon 
that it is necessary because of emergency? The answer is self evident and is negaEve. 
Humans shall acknowledge the legal requirements for the above processes, their rights 
and how they can claim them. In Democracy, States are obligated to save lives avoiding 
losing in fact Democracy.  
The promise and challenge for Governments is to eliminate COVID-19 in the proximate 
future. The promise also, that humans are reassured by States, that personal data 
protecEon will not be eliminated aker all this crisis. Or that humans will not be 
sEgmaEzed because of the data process made during the health “war”. 
Finally, will the next day find us free from all the derogaEon of data, or will we possess 
a familiarity to be data-abused? That will be revealed indeed the next day.  
The present day, we can only know our rights, and try to resist against any monitoring 
that is beyond lawful limits and purposes, or that provides us no disclosure and 
noEficaEon about basic informaEon we need to take into account. And that is the 
resistance we can only achieve: To be efficiently informed, as data subjects, about our 
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rights and to claim our rights’ best applicaEon that shall depend on specific legal basis, 
with all the respect - on our behalf - to public interest, health and wellness. 
Stay COVID-19 safe!  
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• ECHR (European Charter for Human Rights) 
• FRA/EctHR/EDPS, Handbook on European Data ProtecEon Law, 2018 
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